We study whether the effects on registered manufacturing output of dismantling the License Raj -a system of central controls regulating entry and production activity in this sector -vary across Indian states with different labor market regulations. The effects are found to be unequal across In- Despite the pervasiveness of these reforms, there is little sound empirical evidence on whether and how they interact with local institutions. The same nationwide reform could lead to quite different outcomes depending on the local institutional environment in which it takes place.
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In the post-war period, planned industrialization became a widespread development strategy for tackling economic backwardness. However, in the 1980's, amidst growing dissatisfaction about its results, many developing countries progressively liberalized their economies by dismantling government controls over industry and opening up to trade.
Despite the pervasiveness of these reforms, there is little sound empirical evidence on whether and how they interact with local institutions. The same nationwide reform could lead to quite different outcomes depending on the local institutional environment in which it takes place.
The aim of this paper is to examine the interaction between product market deregula-1 tion and the organization of labor markets in India. We focus on a little-studied internal liberalization episode, the dismantling during the 1980's and 1990's of the License Raj -a system of central controls introduced in 1951 regulating entry and production activity in the registered manufacturing sector. Delicensing reforms were staggered over a decade, but were nationwide in scope -when an industry was delicensed, the policy change affected all Indian firms in that industry, irrespective of location. The focus of our analysis is on whether institutional differences across Indian states, particularly in labor market regulations, led to a differential response in the industrial performance to the reform across states.
Our main finding is that, after delicensing, industries located in states with proemployer labor market institutions grew more quickly than those in pro-worker environments. This result stands up to a wide variety of robustness checks. Since pro-worker regulations are, on average, associated with weaker industrial performance, our study shows that dropping barriers to investment and entry via delicensing magnified the disadvantage of states with pro-worker labor market institutions.
Our work relates to several strands of literature. First, several recent papers argue that the impact of pro-competitive reforms on economic performance will vary significantly depending on the technological and institutional environment in which they take place (Philippe Daron Acemoglu, Aghion, and Fabrizio Zilibotti 2006) .
1 Second, there is a literature which studies the effect of labor or entry regula-
ulations (Olivier Blanchard and Francesco Giavazzi 2003; Alejandro Cunat and Melitz 2007).
The paper is structured as follows. Section I provides the relevant historical background and describes how the different data series are constructed. Section II contains the empirical analysis of the links between delicensing, labor regulation environment and industrial performance. Section III concludes.
I. Background and Data
The centerpiece of centrally-planned industrialization in India was the Industries (De- Malik, 1997) . This allowed the government to allocate plan production targets to firms. We use statements on industrial policy, press notes and notifications issued by the federal government to code when different three-digit industries were exempted from industrial licensing. Table 1 for summary statistics of the main variables and the Data Appendix for further information on variable definitions and data sources. Figure A1 of the Appendix, available at the American Economic Review's Web site (http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/contents), displays when each three-digit industry was delicensed. Table A1 provides the detail on how each three-digit industry was coded and Table A2 provides the concordance between the 1970 and 1987 industrial classification systems.
3 regime of Narasimha Rao, who came to power following Rajiv Gandhi's assassination in an election campaign which subsequently returned the Congress party to government.
The 1991 liberalization was prompted by a balance of payment crisis and by the external pressure of the IMF that imposed a structural adjustment program. Industrial licensing was effectively abolished in 1991 except for a small number of industries where it was retained "for reasons related to security and strategic concerns, social reasons, problems related to safety and overriding environmental issues, manufacture of products of hazardous nature and articles of elitist consumption" (Government of India 1991). As with the case of Gandhi, the depth of the reformist tendencies of the Rao government was largely unanticipated. There are few instances of delicensing away from the leadership transitions in 1985 and 1991. 3 From 1991 onwards tariff barriers were also progressively reduced and restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) relaxed (Pravin Krishna and Devashish Mitra 1998; Petia Topalova 2005) . It is therefore important for us to separate the effects of delicensing from those of trade and FDI liberalization. To capture trade liberalization we construct a measure of the actual tariff rate applied by customs officials at the Indian border by combining basic, auxiliary and countervailing rates of duty for each three-digit industry between 1980 and 1997. These provide us with a direct measure of the evolving Indian trade policy regime and enable us to control for the effects of trade liberalization in our regressions. To capture FDI liberalization we record, from 1991 onwards, how many six-digit products within a three-digit industry were opened to automatic approval of FDI (up to 51 percent equity). Our measure takes a value of zero before 1991 when FDI was strictly controlled. In Table 1 we see that our applied tariff is high and relatively flat across the 1980-1990 period and then falls dramatically after 1990. The FDI reform measure increases after 1990 following the relaxation of controls on foreign investment.
We match our delicense, tariff and FDI reform measures with state-industry panel data on the registered manufacturing sector for the period 1980-1997 drawn from the Annual Survey of Industries.
4 This is the most disaggregated level at which one can obtain representative data on industrial performance across the pre-and post-delicensing periods. The sampling unit is a state and three-digit industry pair, so that the data are representative at the state-three-digit industry level. To minimize the role played by industry entry and exit in explaining our results we restrict our attention to a balanced panel of state-industries on which data exist for all eighteen years of our data set. Under the Factories Act of 1948 enterprises are required to register if either they have more than ten employees and electric power or have more than twenty employees and no electric power. Smaller enterprises below these size thresholds are classified as part of unregistered manufacturing and are not covered by the Annual Survey of Industries. In our sample period, registered manufacturing makes up about 9 percent of total state output and unregistered manufacturing around 5 percent. 5 We check that all our results are robust to running regressions on an unbalanced panel where industries are in the data for at least ten years and are active in at least five states. This raises our sample size to 24,374 observations.
given year, we cumulate the scores over time to give a quantitative picture of how the regulatory environment evolved over the 1947-1997 period.
There is heterogeneity in both the level and change of labor regulation across our 1980-1997 sample period. The most extreme pro-worker state, West Bengal, has labor regulation values which rise from +2 to +4 over the 1980-1997 period. Three other states (Gujarat, Maharashtra, Orissa) are also recorded as beginning the period as pro-worker or amending in this direction. The most extreme pro-employer state, Andhra Pradesh, has a score that varies from -2 to -3 across our period. Four other states (Kerala, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka) begin the period as pro-employer or amend in that direction. There are six neutral states (Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh) that begin the period at 0 and do not amend in either direction. Finally, Madhya Pradesh is neutral in all years except for a pro-employer change in 1982 which is reversed by a 1983 pro-worker amendment.
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Labor regulations, industrial licensing and the Annual Survey of Industries only apply to registered manufacturing. Our data are therefore well-suited to examine how product market deregulation, in the form of delicensing, interacts with heterogeneous state-level labor institutions in shaping the pattern of industrial development across Indian states.
II. Empirical Analysis

A. Method
Our interest centers on the delicense-labor regulation interaction coefficient which captures the role of state-specific labor regulation in mediating the impact of the delicensing reform on industrial performance. To examine this interaction we estimate a regression of the form:
(1)
where y i,s,t is the logarithm of three-digit state-industry real output, d i,t is a dummy variable which takes the value of unity in the year a three-digit industry is delicensed and then stays equal to one thereafter, r s,t is the labor regulation measure for state s at time t, α i,s are state-industry interactions which control for any unobserved time-invariant determinants of state-industry performance (e.g. natural endowments, location), η i,t are industry-year interactions which control for differential industry-specific time effects (e.g. technological innovation), β s,t are state-year interactions which control for differential state-specific time effects (e.g. macro shocks), and ε i,s,t is a stochastic error. The coefficient of interest (θ) is identified by the mix of industry-year variation in delicensing interacted with state-year variation in labor regulation.
We cluster the standard errors by state and year of delicensing. This is not only to address serial correlation concerns (and to allow for heteroskedasticity) but also to take account of the fact that delicensing is highly clustered in time. Delicensing happened overwhelmingly in 1985 and 1991, implying that different industries within a state in these years cannot be treated as independent observations.
B. Results
If the licensing system was acting as a barrier to entry we would expect its removal to be associated with an increase in entry in delicensed relative to still-licensed industries. The inclusion of industry-year and state-year interactions in equation (1) precludes estimating the average effects of delicense and labor regulation as these vary at the industry-year and state-year level respectively. We therefore begin our analysis by presenting in Table 2 results for a specification where the industry-year and state-year interactions in equation (1) have been replaced with year fixed effects and where the delicense-labor regulation interaction term has also been omitted. In column (1), we find that delicensing leads to a statistically significant increase in the number of factories within an industry of around 6 percent.
7 The delicensing reform therefore does appear to have encouraged entry. In column (2) we include labor regulation as an additional regressor.
The coefficient on labor regulation is negative and significant, indicating that states that have moved in a pro-worker direction experience less net entry relative to pro-employer states. The coefficient on delicense remains positive and significant, and of a similar magnitude. Delicensing and pro-worker labor regulation are thus pulling in opposite directions in determining the number of factories operating in state-industries.
Columns (3) and (4) use the same specification to examine the average effects of delicensing and labor regulation on output. In column (3), we find a positive, but not statistically significant effect of delicensing. The small average effect on output, however, may be masking substantial heterogeneity of delicensing effects depending on the institutional conditions in Indian states. Output may have risen in some states and fallen in other states in response to the same nationwide delicensing reform. To examine this possibility we added interactions between state fixed effects and delicense to the specification in column (3) of Table 2 . We find that the coefficient on this interaction is positive in nine states and negative in seven states -delicensing led to a rise in output in some states and a fall in output in other states (relative to industries where licensing was retained). 8 We also find a similar pattern of effects for employment and fixed capital -the average effect of delicensing is small and insignificant but hides considerable heterogeneity across states.
7 Unfortunately, we do not observe separate entry and exit flows, but changes in the number of factories operating in a state-industry provide us with a measure of net entry.
8 Eleven of the sixteen delicense-state interactions are statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. We can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on delicense is the same across states at the 1 percent level. In the interest of brevity we do not report the individual coefficients on the delicense-state interactions.
A key question concerns which characteristics of states affect how industries located within their borders respond to delicensing. Of particular interest, are policies and institutions over which state governments exercise some control. In column (4) of Table   2 we find that regulation in a pro-worker direction is associated with lowered output relative to regulating in a pro-employer direction. This lines up with a growing body of evidence which suggests that labor regulation affects industrial performance across Indian states.
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In this paper we examine whether state-specific labor institutions mediated the impact of the nationwide delicensing reform on industrial performance across Indian states.
Column (1) of Table 3 presents results from estimating a regression of the form described in equation (1). The delicense-labor regulation interaction coefficient is negative and significant indicating that, when delicensing occurred, industries in states with proemployer regulation experienced larger increases in output relative to those located in pro-worker states.
10 This is the key result in the paper. Given the demanding nature of the specification this is compelling evidence that labor regulations passed over time at the state level affected how industries responded to a nationwide delicensing experiment.
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We checked that our findings are not driven by individual states by sequentially excluding each state from the sample and reestimating the column (1) specification of 9 Besley and Burgess (2004) show that states which amended in a pro-worker direction in the pre-1992 period experienced lowered output, employment, investment and productivity in registered manufacturing. In contrast, output in unregistered manufacturing increased. Labor regulation therefore seems to be capturing something specific to the institutional environment facing firms in registered manufacturing. Unfortunately data on unregistered manufacturing is not available at the state-industry level across our sample period.
10 We find a similar result for a specification that includes state-industry interactions and year fixed effects (see column (1) of Table A3 in the Appendix). The delicense-labor regulation coefficient (standard error) is -0.070 (0.018).
11 A model developed in the working paper version of the paper helps us to understand this key result. Delicensing encourages firm entry and expansion but more so in pro-employer states. The falls in price that ensue lead to exit and contraction of less productive firms particularly in pro-worker states. The net effect is a reallocation of economic activity towards proemployer states (see Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti 2006) . Table 3 . In each case the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between delicense and labor regulation remains significant at the 5 percent level and is not statistically significantly different from the estimate for the full sample. This suggests that our results capture a general relationship between industrial performance, delicensing and labor market institutions rather than the influence of individual states.
A potential concern is that state labor regulations are responding to changes in industrial development following delicensing. Therefore, column (2) considers a specification where we interact delicense with state labor regulations in 1980 before delicensing occurred. State-level amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded and cumulated from 1947, so column (2) examines whether pre-delicensing cross-state variation in labor regulation affected how industries responded to delicensing in subsequent years.
The interaction coefficient continues to be negative and significant and of similar magnitude to the column (1) result, indicating that industries located in states classified as pro-employer in 1980 tended to grow more quickly, relative to their counterparts in pro-worker states, after they were delicensed.
To provide further evidence against a feedback from industrial development to la- Our IV strategy is to predict labor regulation using a first-stage regression, which includes our two instruments, state fixed effects and year fixed effects, for the period 1958-1997. 12 We then interact the predicted value of labor regulation with delicense and include it in our second-stage regression. The result is in column (3) of Table 3 .
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The estimated coefficient on the delicense-labor regulation interaction is of a similar magnitude to that in column (1) and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, supporting our interpretation of the interaction term as capturing the role of statespecific labor regulation in determining the heterogeneous impact of delicensing.
In Column (4) we include a set of interactions between each state fixed effect and delicense. These interactions control for all fixed state characteristics which affect how industries respond to delicensing, including cross-state differences in labor regulation at the beginning of our sample period. The identification of the delicense-labor regulation interaction coefficient now solely comes from changes in labor regulation during the sample period. Even with this limited variation (see Figure A2 in the Appendix) the coefficient remains negative and significant indicating that, after being delicensed, industries located in states which moved in a pro-employer direction experienced greater output growth relative to those located in states which moved in a pro-worker direction.
When we reestimate the specification from column (1) of Table 3 for two alternative measures of industrial performance -total employment and fixed capital -we find similar magnitudes of interaction effects. The estimated delicense-labor regulation coefficients (standard errors) are -0.050 (0.019) and -0.054 (0.020) respectively. Therefore pro-worker states experience less employment growth and investment relative to pro-employer states following delicensing.
Our results demonstrate that liberalization had unequal effects across Indian states, and accentuated the importance of labor regulation in determining the trajectory of industrial activity in India. To gauge the economic significance of our findings we construct a counterfactual of what would have happened to the distribution of output across Indian states had delicensing had no heterogenous effects in states with different labor regulations. To do this we first construct fitted values for log output using the specification in column (1) of Table 3 . We next construct a counterfactual series for log output without heterogeneous effects of delicensing (by falsely assuming that θ = 0 in column (1) of Table 3 ).
14 Taking exponents and summing across industries within each state allows us to compare the evolution of state output with and without heterogeneous effects of delicensing (see Figure A3 in the Appendix).
The largest relative increases in output following delicensing are found in Andhra
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, the states with the most pro-employer labor regulations.
Output in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, is around 10 percent higher in 1997 relative to the counterfactual. In contrast, output in West Bengal and Maharashtra, the states with the most pro-worker regulations, is 18 percent and 9 percent lower. Similar results are found for employment and fixed capital.
15
Collectively these results paint a consistent picture. State labor regulations affected in a sizeable fashion the relative development of registered manufacturing across Indian states following the delicensing episodes of the 1980's and 1990's.
C. Robustness
Liberalization in 1991 in India came as a package. Trade tariffs were reduced and restrictions on foreign direct investment were relaxed at the same time that the second wave of delicensing was taking place. These reforms were enacted centrally and vary across industries and time (see Krishna and Mitra 1998; Topalova 2005) . Table 4 checks whether our delicense-labor regulation result is robust to controlling for interactions between these other industry-year varying elements of the liberalization package and labor regulation.
We begin by examining the interaction between our tariff measure and labor regulation. In a specification with state-industry interactions and year dummies this interaction is positive and significant suggesting that tariff reductions led to output expansion in pro-employer states relative to pro-worker states.
16 This result, however, is not robust to controlling for industry-year and state-year interactions as is shown in column (1) of Table 4 . In column (2) we include the interaction of labor regulation with both tariff and delicense alongside one another. The delicense-labor regulation interaction remains negative and significant (and of the same magnitude as in column (1) of Table 3 ), indicating robustness to controlling for the interaction of trade liberalization with labor regulation. When we include both FDI reform-labor regulation and tariff-labor regulation interactions in column (3), we find that neither are significant. In column (4) we include our FDI reform measure interacted with labor regulation alongside the delicenselabor regulation and tariff-labor regulation interactions. We find that the delicense-labor regulation interaction remains significant (and of similar magnitude to our earlier result from column (1) in Table 3 ). Our central finding is therefore robust to controlling for the interaction of both trade liberalization and FDI reform with labor regulation. The coefficient on the delicense-development expenditure interaction in column (1) of Table 5 is positive and significant suggesting that within each industry, states with larger development expenditures tend to gain more from the delicensing reform relative to those that spend less. The delicense-financial development coefficient is also positive and significant suggesting that states which expanded access to finance benefited from delicensing relative to those where bank branch expansion was less marked. The coefficient on the delicense-labor regulation interaction, however, remains negative and significant, and similar in magnitude to column (1) of Table 3 , when we include these controls.
17 Between 1977 and 1990 the Indian Central Bank imposed a licensing rule which required that for each branch opened in a banked location four had to be opened in unbanked locations. Burgess and Pande (2005) use the number of bank branches per capita in 1961 interacted with (i) a post-1976 time trend and (ii) a post-1989 time trend as instruments for state-level bank branch expansion. Standard errors in columns (1) to (3) of Table 5 have been adjusted to take account of the fact that predicted financial development is generated in a first-stage regression.
Labor market regulations may also be correlated with the technological level of industries in a given state. To address this concern we construct a dummy for whether a state-industry is in the top, middle or bottom tercile of the cross-state distribution of labor productivity for a given year. We then interact the top and bottom tercile dummies with our delicense measure omitting the middle tercile interaction which serves as a reference. In column (2) of Table 5 (which also contains the development expenditure and financial development controls from column (1)) we see that being in the top tercile is associated with a larger increase in output after delicensing relative to being in the middle tercile.
18 Being in the bottom tercile is associated with smaller increases.
Both effects are large in magnitude and highly statistically significant. Technological level clearly has a bearing on which state-industries in a three-digit sector benefit from delicensing. Controlling for technology, however, has little effect on the delicense-labor regulation interaction term which remains negative and significant and of similar magnitude to column (1) of Table 3 . The direction of labor regulation in a state does not appear to be just proxying for how technologically advanced industries in a state are.
Many aspects of the policy environment are difficult to measure. In column (4) of Table 3 we have shown that our results are robust to including delicense-state interactions which control for the role that unobserved time-invariant state characteristics play in mediating the impact of delicensing. Omitted interactions between delicense and unobserved time-varying state policies, however, remain a concern. As a further robustness check, we therefore add in controls for the political complexion of states on the grounds that policies towards the registered manufacturing sector are likely to be correlated with political outcomes. We expect past political outcomes to matter as they determine the attitude towards business that prevails in the bureaucracy and polity. This attitude will affect a range of policy actions that we cannot observe in our data. We therefore assemble a picture of each state's "political history" as measured by the number of years since 1957 that particular political groupings have held a majority of the seats in the state legislature. The relevant groupings for this exercise are: the Congress party, hard-left parties, regional parties, Janata parties and Hindu parties. The results are in column (3), which also contains the full set of controls for development expenditure, financial development and technology from columns (1) and (2). The coefficient on the interaction between delicense and labor regulation remains negative and significant and of similar magnitude to column (1) of Table 3 when we control for the interaction between delicense and state political histories. The same result holds if we use the contemporaneous share of seats held in state assemblies in these five groupings interacted with delicense.
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The timing of delicensing varies across industries. A natural question to ask is whether the actual year in which industries are delicensed matters. To investigate this we run a Monte Carlo simulation in which we draw a random year in which an industry is delicensed from the empirical distribution of delicensing years. We do this for each three-digit industry, thus creating a random or "placebo" delicense measure. We repeat this process to generate one hundred placebo delicense measures. For each of the placebo measures the probability of an industry being delicensed in a given year matches that in the actual data but we randomize over the identities of industries.
In a first falsification exercise we then estimate our regression specification (1) using the placebo delicense measures in the place of our actual delicense measure. In ninetythree of the one hundred regressions, we find that the placebo delicense-labor regulation 19 As part of a wider sensitivity analysis, not reported in the paper, we included all of the following additional variables interacted with delicense in columns (1) to (3) of Table 5 : (i) the constituent health, education and other expenditure elements of development expenditure (to more finely control for state-government spending behavior), (ii) the proportion of people below the poverty line in a state (to capture overall backwardness), (iii) state-specific differences between industrial and agricultural electricity tariffs (to capture cross-subsidization of agriculture) and (iv) cumulative state land reform acts from Besley and Burgess (2000) (to capture how pro-rural a state was). In all these regressions the delicense-labor regulation interaction remains negative and highly significant. interaction has a lower absolute t statistic than the actual delicense-labor regulation interaction (from column (1) of Table 3 ). In a second falsification exercise we include both the actual and placebo delicense measures interacted with labor regulation in our regression specification (1). The actual delicensing-labor regulation interaction is significant at the 5 percent level in ninety-eight of the one hundred regressions, whereas the placebo delicense-labor regulation interaction is significant at the 5 percent level in only seven of the regressions. The results of both falsification exercises serve as compelling evidence that the actual timing of when industries are delicensed is central to our main empirical result.
A final concern is that the sequencing of delicensing may be driven by the underlying performance of industries. The fact that delicensing was a centrally-managed technocratic reform which was, in part, triggered by largely unexpected shocks (Rajiv Gandhi's sudden rise to power and the IMF-imposed structural adjustment program under Narasimha Rao) helps to allay the concern that industries may have acted in anticipation of economic reforms. However, the industries that were delicensed in different waves may have been selected according to some characteristics related to performance potential. In particular, reformers in 1985 may have not chosen industries randomly. The concern is less severe for the 1991 wave as this covered most of the remaining industries, and the criterion for the exclusion of a few industries was their strategic, environmental and social importance. Endogenous sequencing would be a problem for analyzing the impact of delicensing if the selection criterion were correlated with the expected future performance of state-industries at the time of the reform.
20 As a crude check on this we ran a cross-section regression of the year in which a three-digit industry was delicensed on output growth in that industry during the 1980-84 period (prior to the first wave of delicensing). This is intended to detect whether politicians selected industries in 1985 according to their degree of economic success. We find no evidence of a relationship between when an industry is delicensed and pre-reform output growth (the estimated coefficient of interest is -0.383, and the standard error is 1.436). Similar results are found using other measures of pre-reform industrial performance such as employment or labor productivity growth during 1980-84. 21 The absence of systematic differences in pre-reform economic performance between industries that are delicensed in each of the two waves is reassuring.
III. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the extent to which the effects on registered manufacturing output of dismantling the License Raj -a system of central controls governing entry and expansion in this sector -vary across Indian states with different labor market regulations. To do this we employ a difference-in-difference econometric specification that includes state-industry, industry-year and state-year interactions to control for a variety of unobserved effects. The main finding is that output rose more in pro-employer states than it did in pro-worker states in response to the same delicensing reform. This central result stands up to a wide variety of robustness checks and the delicense-labor regulation interaction coefficient is similar in size and significance across a range of specifications.
Delicensing resulted in a sizeable reallocation of industrial production from states with pro-worker labor institutions to states with pro-employer labor institutions. A policy implication of our analysis is that liberalization tends to make the creation of a more favorable investment climate a more pressing concern. This may require complementary institutional reforms as well as redistributive policies that ease the costs of adjustment associated with liberalization. Table A2 in the Appendix). (3) are corrected for instrumented labor regulation being generated in a first-stage regression. See the Data Appendix for further information on variable definitions and the data sources. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Table 4 and Table 3 is due to the fact that there are a small number of three digit industries for which tariff data is unavailable. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on state×year delicensed are reported in parentheses. Log real output is log real registered manufacturing output. Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-worker, 0=neutral and -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over 1947-97 to generate the labor regulation measure. Log tariff rate is the log tariff rate applied to a three-digit industry. FDI reform is a variable which before 1991 is equal to zero and after 1991 is equal to the fraction of Harmonized System 6-digit products within a three-digit industry opened to automatic approval of foreign direct investment (FDI) for up to 51 percent equity.
See the Data Appendix for further information on variable definitions and the data sources. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Table 5 : The data set is a balanced panel of three-digit state-industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 to 1997. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on state×year delicensed are reported in parentheses. Log real output is log real registered manufacturing output. Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-worker, 0=neutral and -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over 1947-97 to generate the labor regulation measure. Log development expenditure is real per capita state spending on social and economic services. Financial development is from Burgess and Pande (2005) (1) to (3) of Table 5 have been adjusted to take account of the fact that predicted financial development is generated in a first-stage regression. Top industry productivity tercile is a dummy which is one if a state-industry lies in the top third of the cross-state within-industry labor productivity distribution each year and zero otherwise. Bottom industry productivity tercile is a dummy which is one if a state-industry lies in the bottom third of the cross-state within-industry labor productivity distribution and zero otherwise. Congress, hard left, regional, Janata and Hindu majority are counts of the number of years for which these political groupings held a majority of the seats in the state legislatures since 1957. See the Data Appendix for further information on variable definitions and the data source. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 274  389  269  387  268  386  267  385  266  384  265  383  264  382  262  381  261  379  260  378  259  372  258  371  257  370  254  362  250  361  248  349  247  345  323  380  246  340  322  376  245  336  321  375  243  335  320  374  242  334  313  369  241  333  312  368  240  332  306  367  236  329  305  366  235  326  304  360  234  325  377  299  359  233  324  319  293  358  232  317  318  292  357  231  311  316  289  356  230  303  308  286  354  224  301  307  285  353  218  296  229  283  352  216  295  227  281  351  215  291  226  280  350  214  288  225  219  346  213  287  327  223  217  344  209  284  294  222  212  343  208  279  273  221  210  342  205  277  272  220  203  339  309  201  276  355  271  207  388  202  331  204  310  200  275  290  270  206 Year Notes: The figure displays the years in which different three-digit registered manufacturing industries in India were delicensed over the 1980-97 period. The industries shown in the Never column had not been delicensed as of 1997. Numbers refer to three-digit codes in the concordance of the 1970 and 1987 industrial classifications in Table A2 . See Table A1 for the detail on how each three-digit industry was coded. See the Data Appendix for further information on variable definitions and the data sources. 1993 1997 1982 1985 1986 1991 1989 Industries Table 3 ) to counterfactual state output obtained by setting the delicense-labor regulation interaction to zero in this specification. The fitted-counterfactual ratio has been multiplied by one hundred to be expressed as a percentage. Deviations from a value of one hundred are attributable to the heterogeneous effects of delicensing across states due to their different labor market regulations. Since industry-year and state-year effects absorb, respectively, the level effects of delicensing and labor regulation, the difference between the fitted and counterfactual series can only identify the heterogeneous effects of delicensing. Vertical lines denote the two waves of delicensing in 1985 and 1991. 
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Notes:
The data set is a balanced panel of three-digit state-industries that are present in the data in all 18 years and includes an average of 64 three-digit industries in the 16 states over the period 1980 to 1997. The difference in the number of observations between column (1) and columns (2)- (7) is due to the fact that there are a small number of three digit industries for which tariff data is unavailable. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by state×year delicensed are reported in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. Log real output is log real registered manufacturing output. Delicense is a dummy variable which is one if all or part of a three-digit industry is delicensed in a particular year and zero otherwise. Log tariff rate is the log tariff rate applied to a three digit industry. FDI reform is a variable which before 1991 is equal to zero and after 1991 is equal to the fraction of Harmonized System 6-digit products within a three-digit industry opened to automatic approval of foreign direct investment (FDI) for up to 51 percent equity. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-worker, 0=neutral, -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over 1947-97 to generate the labor regulation measure. See the Data Appendix for further information on variable definitions and the data sources.
